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INSTRUCTING A JURY IN WASHINGTON
HON. LLOYD L. WUEHL*
One of the most burdensome, time-consuming and vexing aspects
of a jury trial is the preparation of jury instructions. Several matters
in the area of instructions are particularly troublesome in Washington,
and the purpose of this article is to analyze some of them, point out
certain pitfalls, and make certain suggestions, with emphasis on simpli-
fication and standardization.
The effectiveness of jury instructions may be improved, their sus-
ceptibility to error reduced and their preparation made less arduous by
simplifying and standardizing them. They may be simplified by giving
fewer instructions and by eliminating, as far as possible, all long, "ify,"
complicated and confusing theoretical instructions. As stated by Pro-
fessor Samore: "There is some basis for the conclusion that too many
instructions could not enlighten a seasoned lawyer, let alone a jury of
laymen. The hypothetical instruction, for example, usually is incredibly
complex, the 'ifs' snowballing until an entire page of print may be
consumed."'
Instructions may be standardized by adopting so-called "uniform
instructions," as has been done in King and Yakima Counties in Wash-
ington. The products of those counties, however, are very limited in
scope. In the interest of saving time, helping to prevent a backlog of
cases, and reducing error and frequency of appeal, the bench and bar
should be encouraged in developing state-wide, uniform or pattern jury
instructions. While standardized instructions should never be used
blindly or isolated from the particular facts of a case, they are extremely
useful as time-saving and error-preventing devices, since they may serve
as patterns or guides, if not as exact expositions of the law.
SIMPLICITY
The purpose of jury instructions in any case is and should be to
advise the jurors of the principles of law applicable to the particular
* Judge of the Superior Court, Yakima County, Washington.
I Samore, Preface to 1 Rsm's BRANSON INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES at iii [hereinafter
cited as REm's BRANSON] (3d ed. Samore, 1960).
2"An instruction is an exposition of the principles of the law applicable to the
case in its entirety, or to some branch or phase of the case, which it is the duty of
the jury to apply in order to render a verdict establishing the rights of the parties
in accordance with the facts proved." Jackson v. Department of Labor & Indus., 54
Wn.2d 643, 648, 343 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1959), quoting from 1 REm's BRANSON § 1 (3d
ed. 1936). (Emphasis added.)
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facts of the case as simply and succinctly as possible.' Too many at-
torneys and judges fail to do this effectively because they forget that
jurors are not lawyers or versed in legal terminology, and that they
become confused by complicated and voluminous instructions. In
rather simple cases the writer has had as many as forty proposed in-
structions presented to him by each side, not including stock instruc-
tions. If any considerable amount of the proposed instructions are
given, together with a long narrative of the pleadings and the usual
stock instructions, the result will probably be a volume completely
confusing and unintelligible to the ordinary juror. As an end result,
most of the instructions will usually be totally ignored by the jury.
Even though long complicated instructions are ignored, the case may
end up in an appellate court, only to be reversed because of an error in
an instruction. Judge Jerome Frank has stated:
Time, money and lives are consumed in debating the precise words
which the judge may address to the jury, although everyone who stops
to see and think knows that these words might as well be spoken in a
foreign language-that, indeed, for all the jury's understanding of them,
they are spoken in a foreign language. Yet, every day, cases which have
taken weeks to try are reversed by upper courts because a phrase or a
sentence, meaningless to the jury, has been included or omitted from
the judge's charge.3
Many jury instructions are not only meaningless to the average juror,
but "Further, the more accurately a general charge is written, the
more difficult it is for a layman to understand it. The anomaly is that
the necessity for the general instruction creates pitfalls over legal
distinctions which appellate courts will consider as requiring new trials,
which distinctions have no effect on jury deliberations."'
This is not a criticism of the appellate court, since of necessity it
must assume that all instructions are carefully studied and readily
understood by the jury, even though as a practical matter such is not
the case. At least one court has faced the problem squarely, however.
In a case in which "the trial court was deluged with sixty requested in-
structions, twenty-seven of which were asked by defendants,"5 the Ore-
gon Supreme Court said:
It is not surprising that the court's instructions might have failed to
entirely satisfy counsel and, in one or two instances, perhaps to have
strayed somewhat from the paths of accuracy. However, we believe,
8 FRANK, LAW AND THF MODEM MiND 181 (6th printing 1949).
4 Grubb, False Fears, 26 INs. COUNSEL J. 481 (1959).
5 Ellensberger v. Fremont Land Co., 165 Ore. 375, 107 P.2d 837, 842 (1940).
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under such circumstances, the appellate court should be somewhat
charitable to trial courts and, in the language of the poet, "be to their
faults a little blind and to their virtues very kind.",,
The Washington Supreme Court has on occasion stressed the need
for simplicity of instructions.' In a case in which the instructions
covered thirty-three pages of the transcript, the court in speaking of
the trial court's refusal to give them to the jury, stated:
[W] e feel that, if given, they would have tended to confuse the minds of
the jurors rather than aid them in reaching a correct verdict.,
It is the duty of the court to state the law to the jury as succinctly
and directly as possible. This is best done by a few simple, direct, and
plain statements which cover the issues rather than by a voluminous
and lengthy dissertation upon the law involved, or, where the issues are
not numerous or complicated, by numerous instructions.8
The more simply and plainly instructions can be framed and cover the
issues, the better the jury will understand them, and the less likely will
they be to run counter to some rule of law.10
What then, can be done to simplify instructions and make them more
understandable to lay jurors?
Instruction on Issues of the Case. To start, let us first consider the
old practice of giving a narrative or almost complete quotation of the
pleadings, which often consume several pages of instructions. In con-
solidated cases or cases containing several claims, such an instruction
may consume many more pages. Very often, many of the original
issues as outlined by the pleadings must be removed from the jury's
consideration by following the long narrative instructions with numer-
ous special instructions. In other words, you first give the jury certain
issues and then take part of them away. This is a useless, confusing
and unnecessary feature. It is not necessary that the court follow the
wording or arrangement of the pleadings in stating the issues to the
jury; the court may adopt language of its own choosing." The only
material inquiry is whether the jury was properly instructed as to the
issues.1
6 Ibid.
7Mathias v. Eichelberger, 182 Wash. 185, 45 P.2d 619 (1935) ; Stanhope v. Strang,
140 Wash. 693, 697, 250 Pac. 351, 352 (1926). See also 1 REID's BRANSON 484 (1960).8 Mathias v. Eichelberger, supra note 7, at 192-93, 45 P.2d at 622.
9 Mathias v. Eichelberger, 182 Wash. 185, 193, 45 P.2d 619, 622 (1935), quoting
from 2 BANCROFT'S CODE PRACTICE AND REMEDIES § 1474.
10 Mathias v. Eichelberger, 182 Wash. 185, 193, 45 P.2d 619, 622 (1935), quoting
from In re Keithley's Estate, 134 Cal. 9, 66 Pac. 5 (1901).




In Murray v. Mossman,5 the Washington court points out the
danger of quoting too extensively from the pleadings when defining
the issues. The trial court's duty is fulfilled when it simply, clearly and
concisely calls attention to the essential issues of the case or contentions
of the parties as they are developed at the pre-trial conference, if any,
or as developed during the trial of the case. In Lee v. Gleason Co.,
the Washington Supreme Court advised that: "Upon a new trial, it
appears to us that the jury could better be instructed by giving a few
well worded concise instructions covering the issues, in addition to the
ordinary stock instructions given in such cases.""
In striving for simplicity of instruction on the issues, one point is apt
to be overlooked. In instructing on the issues of a negligence case, the
trial court should include reference to all specific acts of negligence
relied upon by each party.16
In Washington it may be difficult to prepare an instruction on the
issues in advance of the trial in some cases, since under the present
Rule 8 of the Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure," the parties
may include as many separate claims or defenses as they have, regard-
less of consistency. In such cases the issues will be considerably nar-
rowed during the trial, if no pre-trial conference has been had, and the
attorneys or court may well wait until the issues of the case are devel-
oped by substantial evidence in the trial of the case.
The old practice of giving long narrative instructions from the plead-
ings may be partially remedied in Washington by use of the new Rules
of Pleading, Practice and Procedure' and by extensive use of pre-trial
conferences. Until such conferences become more popular, however,
it is suggested that the correct procedure is merely to include a brief
statement of the issues or contentions that remain in the case to be
submitted to the jury. It has been a practice for some time in Yakima
County, Washington, for the court to have a conference with counsel
in regard to proposed instructions and at that time a brief statement of
issues can be agreed upon.19
13 52 Wn.2d 885, 329 P.2d 1089 (1958). See also, 1 Rinm's BRANSON § 11 (1960).
14 146 Wash. 66, 262 Pac. 133 (1927).
15 Id. at 72-73, 262 Pac. at 135.
16 See Woods v. Goodson, 55 Wn.2d 687, 349 P.2d 731 (1960).
1 7 WASH. RPPP 8(e) (2). This rule corresponds with FE. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (2).
Is In general the Washington Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure corre-
spond with similarly numbered Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
19 This is authorized by WAsH. RPPP 51.08W. See also Yakima County, Wash.,
Special Rule 30, a portion of which reads as follows: "A -judge trying a case, will,
prior to instructing the jury, except in cases where it may appear unnecessary, cause
a recess to be taken in order to settle the instructions, at which time the attorneys
engaged in the cause will be heard on the proposed instructions."
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Instruction on Theories of the Case. Another means of simplifying
jury instructions is elimination of unnecessary, repetitive, argumenta-
tive and long drawn-out hypothetical or "formula" instructions on each
party's theory of the case. While each party is entitled to have his
theory of the case presented to the jury by proper instructions if there
is evidence to support it,2" it is error for the court to instruct upon some
issue or theory when there is no substantial evidence concerning it.2
The Washington Supreme Court has said that the trial court should
refuse to give proposed instructions dealing with matters not within
the pleadings and evidence.22 It is submitted, however, that the primary
area of concern is the evidence, since the pleadings are deemed amended
to conform to the evidence admitted by the court. Thus, the trial court
should scan the evidence carefully to determine whether there is sub-
stantial evidence to support a theory in regard to which one of the
parties has requested instructions. If there is not, the instruction should
not be given, even though the theory may be in the pleadings. For
example, the court should not instruct on any of the following theories
or doctrines, absent any substantial evidence to support it: Unavoidable
accident,23 deception,24 emergency or sudden peril,25 contributory
negligence,26 last clear chance,27 or damages.2
Giving an instruction on a party's theory of the case is required-
provided there is evidence to support it-and not discretionary with the
trial court.29 The number of instructions given on any party's theory
of the case is discretionary with the court, however."
Although the trial court has it within its discretion to determine how
many instructions should be given regarding each litigant's theory, a
word of caution is in order. Giving too many instructions may result in
20 Getzendaner v. United Pacific Ins. Co., 52 Wn.2d 61, 322 P.2d 1089 (1958);
Owens v. City of Seattle, 49 Wn.2d 187, 299 P.2d 560 (1956).
"' White v. Peters, 52 Wn.2d 824, 329 P.2d 471 (1958).
22 Hall v. Lawton, 36 Wn.2d 317, 217 P.2d 796 (1950).2SPement v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 53 Wn.2d 768, 337 P.2d 30 (1959); Barnes
v. Labor Hall Ass'n, 51 Wn2d 421, 319 P2d 554 (1957); Brewer v. Berner, 15
Wn.2d 644, 131 P.2d 940 (1942).24 Bellantonio v. Warner, 47 Wn.2d 550, 288 P2d 459 (1955).
25 Bennett v. McCready, 157 Wash. Dec. 211, 356 P2d 712 (1960) ; Washburn v.
Ensley, 53 Wn.2d 570, 335 P2d 471 (1959).
26 Cote v. Allen, 50 Wn.2d 584, 313 P.2d 693 (1957).
27 Tosto v. City of Seattle, 25 Wn2d 281, 171 P.2d 194 (1946).
28 Nelson v. Fairfield, 40 Wn.2d 496, 244 P.2d 244 (1952).
29 Cases cited note 20 supra; 1 REm's BRANsoN § 5 (1960). The test to be ap-
plied, in determining whether a trial court has given adequate instructions on a party's
theory of the case, is as follows: "May counsel, from the instructions given, satisfac-
torily argue his theory of negligence to the jury?" Short v. Hoge, 158 Wash. Dec.
38, 44, 360 P.2d 565, 569 (1961).
80 Ulve v. Raymond, 51 Wn.2d 241, 317 P.2d 908 (1957); Cantrill v. American
Mail Line, 42 Wn.2d 590, 257 P.2d 179 (1953).
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overemphasis and constitute error."' In considering the number of in-
structions to be given on any party's theory, the trial court should be
constantly alert to avoid overemphasis. If one instruction adequately
covers a single theory, then other proposed instructions, even though
couched in different language, should be refused. With the perils of
overemphasis in mind, the trial court might very well refuse to give
instructions on such elaborations as "unavoidable accident," 2 since
the matter is usually well covered by the stock instructions on negli-
gence, proximate cause, and burden of proof. The same might be said
of the "emergency" and "deception" doctrines.
It is not necessary for each instruction to contain a complete exposi-
tion of the law applying to any given theory if it is covered by other
instructions, since instructions are to be considered as a whole.3 Fur-
ther, while a party is entitled to have his theory of the case presented to
the jury by a proper instruction-if substantial evidence supports it-
it is up to the party to request it. In the absence of a request, the trial
court's failure to instruct on a given theory is not error.34
The most difficult problem arises when "formula," "pinpointed," or
"spotlighted" instructions upon a party's theory in the case are re-
quested. These instructions are usually hypothetical in nature and do
not technically constitute a comment on the evidence. However, many
courts and authorities now question the advisability of giving such
instructions because they become involved and confusing. 5
The question presented to the trial court is whether an abstract or
general' statement of the law containing a party's theory of the case
-9 Jackson v. Department of Labor & Indus., 54 Wn2d 643, 343 P.2d 1033 (1959);
Ulve v Raymond, mupra note 30.
32 For a complete discussion of cases involving "unavoidable accident" instructions,
see Annot, 65 A.L.R.2d 12 (1959). The annotation indicates the perils incident to
such instructions, even though the giving of them, if the theory is supported by sub-
stantial evidence, may not be error. See also Butigan v. Yellow Cab Co., 49 Cal.
App. 2nd 652, 320 P.2d 500 (1958), in which the California Supreme Court, sitting
en banc, held such an instruction not only unnecessary but also confusing and therefore
erroneous. Compare, however, Bennett v. McCready, 157 Wash. Dec. 211, 356 P2d
712 (1960), in which the court held such an instruction proper under the facts of the
case, and differentiated between an emergency and an unavoidable accident See also
Pement v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 53 Wn2d 768, 337 P.2d 30 (1959). It is interesting
here to note that in the new ILLiNOiS PA 'mEN JuRy I sTRUcrIoNs, §§ 12.02-.03 (1961),
the committee recommends against giving either "unavoidable accident" or "emergency"
instructions.
33 Hutton v. Martin, 41 Wn2d 780, 252 P.2d 581 (1953).
"- State v. Myers, 53 Wn.2d 446, 334 P.2d 536 (1959) ; Peterson v. City of Seattle,
51 Wn.2d 187, 316 P.2d 904 (1957).
851 Ram's BRANsoN § 21 (1960). See also 1 CALiFoRNTA JuRy INsTRUcTIors-
CIVL [B A J I] 18 (4th ed. 1956).386 Some cases use the phrase "general" in alluding to instructions and others use the
word "abstract." It is simply a matter of semantics, since an abstract statement refers
to a general as opposed to a particular or specific statement.
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is sufficient. With respect to instructions in the form of abstract legal
principles, the Washington Supreme Court has said that, "a court is not
required to instruct a jury on abstract legal principles,"3 that abstract
instructions are not prejudicial unless they mislead the jury,8 and very
recently, that, "an abstract statement of the law of contributory negli-
gence... was manifestly proper." 9
An analysis of DeKoning v. Williams,0 however, would seem to indi-
cate that the Washington court, at least in 1955, held the view that a
general instruction covering a party's theory of the case was not
sufficient, and that it must be pinpointed, at least to the particular party
to which it applied. The trial court had given a general instruction on
the "emergency doctrine" but did not apply it to the appellant alone.
The instruction was held to be error since the jurors might believe that
the doctrine was also applicable to the respondent. In deciding the case,
the court, perhaps unnecessarily, said: "Each party is entitled to have
his theory of a case presented to the jury by proper instruction, if there
is any evidence to support it, and this right is not affected by the fact
that the law is covered in a general way by instructions given." (Em-
phasis added.) 4
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Schwellenbach strongly criticized the
majority opinion as requiring the giving of "pinpointed" or "high-
lighted" instructions. He said:
It is the duty of the trial judge to advise the jury, without taking sides,
as to what the law is which must guide it in its determination of the case.
Here the trial court, without any favoritism, thoroughly, fairly, and
adequately instructed the jury as to the law covering all of the issues
involved, including appellant's theory of the case.4 2
It was the writer's considered opinion, at the time the DeKoning case
was reported, that the dictum, at least, of the opinion was incorrect.
It calls forth a rash of "pinpointed" and argumentative instructions
under the pretense that they are submitting some party's theory of the
case. One party will submit an instruction reading, "If you find, etc.,
etc., then I instruct you that you should return a verdict for the plain-
tiff." The opposing counsel will then request an instruction reading,
"If you do not find, etc., etc., then I instruct you to return a verdict for
3 Easton v. Chaffee, 16 Wn.2d 183, 192, 132 P.2d 1006, 1010 (1943).38 Bronk v. Davenny, 25 Wn.2d 443, 171 P.2d 237 (1946); Herndon v. City of
Seattle, 11 Wn.2d 88, 118 P.2d 421 (1941).
39 Owens v. Kuro, 56 Wn.2d 564, 574, 354 P.2d 696, 702 (1960).
40 47 Wn.2d 139, 286 P.2d 694 (1955).
411 d. at 141, 286 P.2d at 695.
42 Id. at 147, 286 P.2d at 699.
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the defendant." Or, one counsel will submit an instruction that, "If
you so find, then I instruct you that defendant is guilty of negligence,"
and the opposite party will then propose an instruction, "If you do so
find, (or you do not so find), then I instruct you that the defendant is
not guilty of negligence."
The trial court is presented with the proposition of balancing the
"formula" instructions in such a way as not to overemphasize a point
or to indicate to the jury that he is favoring one side or the other. Some
courts hold such balancing to be necessary." To be fair the court must
give instructions proposed by both sides covering the same point. This
only adds to the confusion of too many instructions.4"
The DeKoning case could and should be limited to the proposition
that a general instruction is bad when the trial court fails to instruct
that it applies to only one of the parties when in fact it does not apply to
both parties. Its dictum, at least, appears to be considerably altered, if
not reversed, by two recent cases, O'Brien v. City of Seattle"' and
Barracliff v. Maritime Overseas Corp." In the Barracliff case, Judge
Hill very adequately and correctly stated: "We have but recently
indicated that pinpointed or spotlighted instructions are not necessary
where adequate general instructions are given."4 7
Since the Barracliff case is in keeping with the modern thinking on
the subject, giving slanted or formula instructions should be avoided
wherever possible. They should be given only where a general instruc-
tion would clearly be inadequate or would confuse or mislead the jury.
While it would be dangerous to totally ignore the DeKoning case, in
view of the Barracliff case it will probably be limited strictly to its facts
and should be followed only where there might be some confusion as to
which party the instruction should apply.
Since the number of instructions to be given on any party's theory of
the case is within the trial judge's discretion, it is the writer's opinion
that one instruction on any particular point should suffice. If that in-
43 See Boles v. Dunham, 208 S.W. 480 (Mo. 1919). See also Hutton v. Martin, 41
Wn.2d 780, 786, 252 P2d 581, 585 (1953), in which the Washington court, in answer
to an objection that a certain instruction singled out one of the parties said: "Such
emphasis as may exist in instruction No. 9 is balanced by naming the deceased in rela-
tion to the same duty in instructions Nos. 23 and 24." (Emphasis added.)
4" "[B]ut instructions when requested by both sides should not be given when they
cover the same point. If it be so, the instructions are unnecessarily drawn out, tend to
confusion, or become meaningless because of constant repetition." Melius v. Chicago,
M. & P. S. Ry., 71 Wash. 64, 70, 127 Pad. 575, 577 (1912).
-5 52 Wn.2d 543, 327 P.2d 433 (1958).
46 55 Wn.2d 695, 349 P2d 1080 (1960).
47 Id. at 701, 349 P.2d at 1084, citing McDonald v. Spokane County, 53 Wn.2d 685,
336 P.2d 127 (1959), Arnold v. United States Gypsum Co., 44 Wn.2d 412, 267 P.2d 689(1954). Accord, Short v. Hoge, 158 Wash. Dec. 38, 360 P.2d 565 (1961).
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struction is general in nature, the court will not be required to reiterate
it two or three times in order to slant it both ways so as to avoid favor-
itism or prejudicial emphasis. Jury instructions will then become less
argumentative, lengthy, complicated and confusing.
Finally, if it is deemed advisable to give a hypothetical or formula
instruction in order to adequately convey a party's theory: (1) Uncon-
troverted facts should not be stated hypothetically; (2) Controverted
facts should always be stated hypothetically; and (3) All of the facts
essential to a directed verdict should be stated if the instruction author-
izes the jury to return a verdict on an affirmative finding of certain facts.
In other words, the instruction should require a finding of all facts
necessary to make out a complete case. Matters such as proximate
cause, contributory negligence, and ordinary care should not be left
out when they are necessary to state a complete case.
PRESUMPTIONS AND BURDEN OF PROOF
The necessity or advisability of instructing on presumptions presents
another perplexing question in Washington. In an effort to arrive at a
satisfactory answer, the trial court and counsel requesting instructions
must work through a body of opinions in which the court has not always
made a careful distinction between presumptions and inferences, con-
clusive and rebuttable presumptions, and between burden of proof and
burden of going forward with the evidence. The area has become
further complicated by the court's failure to attribute the same mean-
ings to words in each case.
Presumptions. The term "presumption" has been defined in vari-
ous ways. As defined by the UNIFORM RULES OF EVMENCE, 48 "A pre-
sumption is an assumption of fact resulting from a rule of law which
requires such fact to be assumed from another fact or group of facts
found or otherwise established in the action." (Emphasis added.)
Similarly, JONES ON EVIDENCE defines a presumption as, "an inference
required by rule of law to be drawn as to the existence of one fact from
the existence of some other established basic fact."4 (Emphasis added.)
The Washington court, in Heidelbacl v. Campbell,5" defines a presump-
tion as, "an inference, affirmative or disaffirmative, of the truth of a
proposition of fact which is drawn by a process of reasoning from some
one or more matters of known fact." While the definition in Heidelbach
48 Rule 13, p. 171. See also Bradley v. Savidge Inc., 13 Wn.2d 28, 123 P2d 780
(1942), for other definitions.
49 1 JoNEs, EVIDENCE § 9 (5th ed. 1958).
50 95 Wash. 661, 668, 164 Pac. 247, 249 (1917).
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v. Campbell is a convenient starting point for the analysis which follows,
it has two objectionable features which detract from its usefulness as a
working definition for the trial court and counsel.
Presumptions arise out of expedience, or continuous human experi-
ence showing probability, which ripens into common law or a statutory
enactment. At this juncture, the first objection to the Heidelback v.
Campbell, as opposed to the UNIFoEm RULES OF EVMENCE-JONES
definition appears. The Heidelback v. Campbell definition addresses
itself only to those presumptions whose good sense commends them.
It does not take presumptions which arise out of expedience into ac-
count. The UNmo1R RuLEs OF EVIDENCE-JoNEs definition, by defin-
ing presumptions in terms of a rule of law, rather than of reason, is
broad enough to include presumptions which arise out of both experi-
ence and expedience.
Presumptions are usually divided into two main classes: conclusive
and rebuttable. Conclusive presumptions, such as the presumption that
all persons have knowledge of the law, are not permitted to be overcome
by any proof. They are rules of substantive law. They will not be
discussed because they do not present a question for the jury except
as to foundation proof.
Rebuttable presumptions should be divided into two sub-classes:
mandatory and permissive. Mandatory presumptions are mandatory in
that they require a certain decision by the jury in the absence of rebut-
tal evidence. They will also be referred to as true presumptions, as
opposed to permissive presumptions, which are really only permissive
inferences. Mandatory presumptions are sometimes referred to as
"rebuttable" or "prima facie" presumptions. They state a rule of evi-
dence rather than a rule of substantive law.
The so-called permissive presumptions are not presumptions at all.
They are permissive inferences, such as the inference of negligence in
res ipsa loquitur cases, and should be treated specially, or the facts
which give rise to them should be submitted as any other circumstantial
evidence." Accordingly, they have been dropped from the definitions
51 See Chase v. Beard, 55 Wn.2d 58, 346 P2d 315 (1959), in which the court appar-
ently holds that res ipsa is only a permissible inference and requires no instruction.
This holding is certainly in keeping with the clear weight of American authority. See
2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 19.11 at 1100 (1956). Accord, PRossEa, TORTS § 43 at 211
(1955). If the trial court feels that a res ipsa instruction is necessary or desirable, the
court should include in the instruction the matter suggested by the Georgia court in
Palmer Brick Co. v. Chenall, 119 Ga. 837, 47 S.E. 329 (1904), which was quoted by
the Washington court in Chase v. Beard. Giving such an instruction in a true res ipsa
case certainly would not be error and might be desirable, where other evidence as to
negligence and/or lack of negligence is missing, in order to properly advise the jurors
as to what they may do with the evidence and inferences at hand.
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of presumptions found in JONES, the UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE,
and the CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS. 5 2
The second objectionable feature of the Heidelbach v. Campbell53
definition is its failure to distinguish between permissive inferences and
mandatory or true presumptions. Since it defines presumptions in terms
of inferences, with no indication of their strength or the effect to be
given them, it is broad enough to include both permissive inferences and
mandatory or true presumptions. The definition and the thinking
which it typifies has produced much confusion.
The Washington Supreme Court has called attention to presumptions
in a large number of cases.54 Very few of the cases contain a discussion
of the difference between so-called permissive (in that they permit the
jury to infer) presumptions and mandatory (in the absence of contrary
proof) presumptions, simply because in most cases there was contrary
proof. As a group, the cases in which the difference is discussed are
confusing.
In Bradley v. Savidge, Inc.,55 the Washington court attempted to
divide presumptions into two main classes: "presumptions of law," and
52 1 B A J I Instruction No. 22 (1959 pocket parts). Accord, 1 R u's BRANsoN
§ 20 (1960).
53 95 Wash. 661, 668, 164 Pac. 247, 249 (1917).
54 State v. Kellberg, 56 Wn.2d 283, 352 P.2d 189 (1960) (presumption of inno-
cence) ; Binder v. Binder, 50 Wn.2d 142, 309 P.2d 1050 (1957) (presumption of mental
competency) ; Callen v. Coca Cola Bottling, 50 Wn.2d 180, 310 P.2d 236 (1957) (pre-
sumption that a person driving another's car is doing so as his agent) ; Spangler v.
Glover, 50 Wn.2d 473, 313 P.2d 354 (1957) (presumption that a publication, libelous
per se, is false) ; Mills v. Pacific County, 48 Wn.2d 211, 292 P.2d 362 (1956) (pre-
sumption of due care); In re Madsen's Estate, 48 Wn.2d 675, 296 P.2d 518 (1956)
(presumptions that property acquired during coverture is community property and that
property remains separate property when once separate) ; Arnold v. National Union
Marine Cooks, 44 Wn.2d 183, 265 P.2d 1051 (1954) (presumption of good reputation
and character) ; In re Peters' Estate, 43 Wn.2d 846, 264 P.2d 1109 (1953) (presump-
tions of continued insanity and of testamentary capacity); Palmer v. Palmer, 42
Wn.2d 715, 258 P.2d 475 (1953) (presumption of legitimacy) ; Lieb v. Webster, 30
Wn.2d 43, 190 P.2d 701 (1948) (presumptions of due delivery of duly mailed letter
and of delivery of deed by its recording) ; Kay v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 28 Wn.2d
300, 183 P.2d 181 (1947) (presumption that a false statement, knowingly made, is
made with intent to deceive) ; Northwest Cities Gas Co. v. Western Fuel Co., 13
Wn.2d 75, 123 P.2d 771 (1942) (presumption of adverse use) ; Brotherton v. Day &
Night Fuel Co., 192 Wash. 362, 73 P.2d 788 (1937) (presumption of negligence arising
from violation of a positive statute, also referred to as "negligence per se," which, con-
trary to some belief, is not a conclusive presumption since it is rebuttable and therefore
mandatory only in the absence of evidence tending to excuse or justify); Camp v.
Peterson, 191 Wash. 634, 71 P.2d 1074 (1937) (presumption that public officers have
performed their duties) ; City of Tacoma v. Peterson, 174 Wash. 621, 25 P.2d 1034
(1933) (presumption that all men are, in law, able to meet their just obligations) ;
Steiner v. Royal Blue Cab Co., 172 Wash. 396, 20 P.2d 39 (1933) (presumption that
owner is operating automobile) ; Shaw v. Prudential Ins. Co., 158 Wash. 43, 290 Pac.
694 (1930) (presumption of death after seven years' absence) ; Stempel v. Oregon Life
Ins. Co., 157 Wash. 678, 290 Pac. 222 (1930) (presumption against suicide) ; Gustaf-
son v. Cullen, 155 Wash. 107, 283 Pac. 1087 (1930) (presumption that all men act
honestly) ; State v. Jones, 80 Wash. 588, 142 Pac. 35 (1914) (presumption of chastity).
55 13 Wn.2d 28, 123 P.2d 780 (1942).
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"presumptions of fact." It then apparently classified mandatory (not
conclusive) presumptions as presumptions of law and permissive pre-
sumptions (permissive inferences) as presumptions of fact. The con-
fusion was compounded by classifying the presumption of agency as a
presumption of fact (permissive inference). For authority, the court
quoted Professor Morgan: "The presumptions which operate to compel
the assumption of B upon the establishment of A owe their existence
... ." (Emphasis added.)5" Obviously, Professor Morgan was speak-
ing of mandatory presumptions because of the word "compel" which
he used. Consequently he was talking about what the court called a
presumption of law; not of fact. It is interesting to note that Professor
McCormick classifies the presumption of agency as a mandatory or
true presumption."
Later, in McGinn v. Kimmel,5" the Washington court further con-
fused the situation by classifying a conclusive presumption as a pre-
sumption of law and a rebuttable presumption as a presumption of fact,
and going on to say: "By treating a presumption of fact (then newly
made to include mandatory, rebuttable presumptions), and an inference
on the same basis with reference to how they may be met and overcome,
we have clarified much confusion and have adopted a rule which is
sound, logical and practical." 9
Finally, in a recent case, Chase v. Beard," the court drew a distinc-
tion between permissive inferences and mandatory presumptions, hold-
ing that res ipsa loquitur (inference of negligence) is merely a permis-
sive inference which requires no instruction to the jury. The Chase v.
Beard opinion is difficult if not impossible to square with the quotation
from McGinn v. Kimmel. What can a trial judge do when requested to
give an instruction on a given presumption?
Professor McCormick attempts to classify presumptions as either
mandatory or permissive.6 Professors Thayer,62 and Wignore63 both
adopt the compulsory or mandatory aspect of a presumption, similar to
56 Morgan, Instructing the Jury upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 HAnv.
L. REv. 59, 77 (1933).5 7 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 642 (1954).
58 36 Wn.2d 786, 221 P2d 467 (1950).
19 Id. at 791, 221 P.2d at 470.
60 55 Wn.2d 58, 346 P2d 315 (1959). Noted 35 WAsH. L. REV. 249 (1960). See
also State v. Thomas, 158 Wash. Dec. 745, 364 P.2d 930 (1961), in which the court
construes a statutory presumption making a prima fade case as a permissive inference.
The holding in this case should, however, probably be limited to statutory presumptions
which operate against the presumption of innocence.
6 McCoRmixC, EVmENCE 641 (1954).62 THAYER, EVMENCE 317, 321, 326 (1898).
63 WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2490 (3d ed. 1940).
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the definitions in JONES and the UNIFORm RULES OF EVIDENCE.64 If
one adopts Professor McCormick's classifications or guesses what the
Washington Supreme Court will hold to be a permissive presumption
(inference) or a true (mandatory) presumption in a particular case, he
finds himself hopelessly confused as to what to tell the jury, if anything.
Consequently, it is suggested that in the future both the trial courts and
the supreme court eliminate all permissive inferences from the category
of presumptions, thus eliminating the necessity of giving instructions
concerning them. In effect, this is what was done in Chase v. Beard."
It is suggested that the elimination of permissive inferences from the
category and concept of presumptions could best be accomplished by
adopting the definition of presumption contained in the UNIFORM
RULES OF EVIDENCE. 66
If the field of presumptions is narrowed to include only those which
require a given verdict in the absence of contrary evidence, the question
remains: What instruction should be given concerning them in the
various situations which may arise? An examination and evaluation of
what the Washington Supreme Court has said with respect to mention-
ing presumptions in instructions to juries follows.
No problem arises in cases where a true presumption is not rebutted
by evidence sufficient to take the matter to the jury. The matter will be
determined by the trial court as a matter of law and a simple instruction
to that effect suffices. However, when the presumption is rebutted by
credible evidence (interested or disinterested), a real question arises
in Washington as to if and when an instruction, setting forth the pre-
sumption and its effect, should be given, and whether such an instruction
is required or is optional. Only a few Washington cases hold that such
an instruction is required." However, there are numerous cases in
which the Washington court has approved, either directly or inferen-
tially, giving such instructions, either in whole or in part."'
64 Rule 13, p. 171. Accord, 1 Rm's BRANSON § 20 (1960).
66 55 Wn.2d 58, 346 P2d 315 (1959). In State v. Thomas, 158 Wash. Dec. 745, 364
P.2d 930 (1961), the Washington court, in discussing a statutory presumption making
a prima facie case, commented that whether an instruction, based on the statute, should
be given is "arguable."6 6 Rule 13, p. 1 7 1 .
67 See Goodwin Co. v. Schwaegler, 147 Wash. 547, 266 Pac. 177 (1928) (requiring
an instruction on presumption of receipt of a letter properly addressed and mailed) ;
State v. Tyree, 143 Wash. 313, 255 Pac. 382 (1927) (requiring an instruction on the
statutory presumption of innocence).
68 State v. Person, 56 Wn2d 283, 352 P.2d 189 (1960) (statutory presumption of
unlawful hunting from possession of a light and firearm) ; City of Seattle v. Bryan,
53 Wn.2d 321, 333 P.2d 680 (1958) (statutory presumption of intoxication from alco-
holic content in blood); Gillingham v. Phelps, 11 Wn.2d 492, 119 P.2d 914 (1941)(statutory presumption that title passes on delivery of goods) ; Luna de ]a Peunte v.
Seattle Times Co., 186 Wash. 618, 59 P.2d 753 (1936) (presumption of good reputation
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The easy way out on this question of instructing on presumptions
would be to say that they should never be mentioned at all. That ap-
proach was adopted in the MODEL CODE OF EVmENCE, 69 and expresses
the Thayerian Theory. Some modern opinions also espouse that
theory. ° Chamberlayne71 believes that an instruction on a presumption
invades the "no comment rule," and should not be given.
Professor Morgan suggests adopting the Pennsylvania Rule that a
presumption shifts not only the burden of going forward with the evi-
dence, but the burden of persuasion as well. Presumptions are then
simply handled by an instruction on the burden of proof alone; not
mentioning the presumption at all."2 The UNIFOIm RuLrs OF Evi-
DENCE 73 have adopted the Pennsylvania Rule in cases where the basic
facts have probative value as evidence of the presumed fact, and the
Thayerian rule in cases where the presumption is one of expediency and
the basic facts have no probative value. Professor McCormick makes
certain other suggestions in regard to instructions. 4
Regardless of theoretical analyses by text writers and court cases to
the contrary, the Washington court seems to have at least approved, if
not required, instructions on presumptions in certain instances.5 It has
held an instruction on presumptions erroneous or unnecessary in only
two types of cases. It has held such an instruction unnecessary in res
ipsa loquitur cases. Res ipsa cases, however, deal with permissive infer-
ences; not with true presumptions. In the other type of cases, the
Washington court, in Hutton v. Martin,77 and Mills v. Pacific County,7
has held it not only unnecessary, but actually erroneous to instruct on
and character) ; Steiner v. Royal Blue Cab Co., 172 Wash. 396, 20 P.2d 39 (1933)
(presumption that car is being operated by owner) ; State v. Dunn, 159 Wash. 608,
294 Pac. 217 (1930) (presumption of innocence) ; Shaw v. Prudential Ins. Co., 158
Wash. 43, 290 Pac. 694 (1930) (presumption of death after seven years' absence);
Biel v. Tolsma, 94 Wash. 104, 161 Pac. 1047 (1916) (presumption of honesty) ; State
v. Jones, 80 Wash. 588, 142 Pac. 35 (1914) (presumption of chastity).
6D Rule 704(2).
70 See McCoRmcK, EvIDENCE § 314 (1954).
712 MODERN LAW oF EviDExcE § 1084 (1916).
72 See Morgan, Presumptions, 12 WAsH. L. Rsv. 255 (1937).
78 Rule 14.
74 McCormick, What Shall the Trial Judge Tell the Jury About Presumptims, 13
WASH. L. REV. 185 (1938).
75 See cases collected in notes 67, 68 supra.
76 See Chase v. Beard, 55 Wn2d 58, 346 P2d 315 (1959), in which the court held
the "doctrine" requires no instruction. But see McKinney v. Frodsham, 157 Wash.
Dec. 21, 356 P.2d 100 (1960), in which the Washington court held an instruction on
res ipsa as erroneous, not on the ground that it was unnecessary or should not have
been given, but on the basis that the "doctrine" did not apply to the factual situation.
The McKinney case therefore indicates that such an instruction on res ipsa would not
be erroneous or forbidden if given in a proper case, even though unnecessary.
77 41 Wn.2d 780, 252 P.2d 581 (1953).
78 48 Wn.2d 211, 292 P.2d 362 (1956).
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the presumption of due care where the issue is contributory negligence.
Since the presumption operates against the party who has the burden
of proving contributory negligence, it establishes in effect a double
burden.
It seems that the rationale underlying the Hutton case should also
apply to the statutory presumption of innocence in criminal cases, where
juries have traditionally been instructed on both the burden of proof
and the presumption of innocence. The Washington court held in State
v. Tyree,"9 that an instruction on the presumption of innocence was
absolutely necessary. Professor McCormick points out the needlessness
of such an instruction, saying: "It seems, however, that the standard
instruction on the state's burden of proving the crime beyond a reason-
able doubt amply covers these points."" ° However, in view of State v.
Tyree, the safer procedure in Washington is for the trial court to con-
tinue to instruct on the presumption of innocence as well as the burden
of proof; at least until the Washington court holds otherwise.
Courts traditionally seem to favor statutory presumptions over com-
mon law presumptions, though no good reason for doing so is apparent.
In a good share of the cases in which the Washington court has ap-
proved instructing on presumptions, they have been statutory pre-
sumptions. Except for the presumption of innocence, a statutory
presumption should not be treated differently from a common law
presumption unless the statute requires a special handling.
With the possible exception of res ipsa cases and with the exception
of cases in which the presumption operates against the party who also
has the burden of persuasion, it appears that in Washington instructions
on presumptions are proper and perhaps necessary in some cases. What
shall the trial court tell a jury concerning a true presumption? What
shall it say about the effect of such a presumption on the burden of
proof?
Much has been written on the requirements of instructions on pre-
sumptions.8 In an early case, Steele v. Northern Pac. Ry.,82 the Wash-
ington court approved an instruction on the presumption of due care
to the effect that the presumption must be overcome or rebutted by a
"preponderance of the testimony." The case was followed by Karp v.
79 143 Wash. 313, 255 Pac. 382 (1927).
go MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 649 (1954).
81 1 JONES, EVIDENCE 205 (5th ed. 1958) ; MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 663 (1954) ; Com-
ment on Rule 14, UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE (1953) ; Comment on Rule 704, MODEL
CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942); Falknor, Notes on Presumptions, 15 WASH. L. REV. 71(1940) ; McCormick, What Shall the Trial Judge Tell the Jury About Presumptions,
13 WASH. L. REV. 185 (1938) ; Morgan, Presumptions, 12 WASH. L. REV. 255 (1937).
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Herder,83 in which an instruction to the effect that the presumption of
due care continues "until it has been overcome by the evidence in the
case," was approved. While the Steele and the Karp cases have been
overruled by Hutton v. Martin8 and Mills v. Pacific County85 insofar
as they approve giving any instruction on the presumption of due care
where the issue is contributory negligence, they have not been criticized
by the Washington court on the wording of the instructions as they per-
tain to the quantum of proof required to overcome a presumption.
In Samuels v. Hiawatha Holstein Dairy Co., 6 the Washington court
upheld an instruction to the effect that whenever a presumption that an
automobile is operated by its owner exists, the burden is then cast upon
the defendants "to overcome such presumption by competent evidence."
This case was followed by Steiner v. Royal Blue Cab Co." in which the
court approved an instruction to the effect that a presumption of opera-
tion of a vehicle by the owner arises when the ownership is admitted or
proved, and that the burden is then cast upon the defendant to over-
come the presumption by "a fair preponderance of all the evidence."
In the Steiner case, the court cited two previous cases, Griffin v. Smith"8
and Foster v. Pacific Clipper Line 9 with approval. In the Griffin case,
the court had held that the presumption stood until "overcome by
testimony to the contrary." In the Foster case, the court upheld an
instruction to the effect that if the facts raised a presumption of negli-
gence on the part of the defendant who had set up an affirmative defense
of due care, then the burden of removing the presumption was on the
defendant, and a jury should find for the plaintiff if the evidence was
"evenly balanced." While the Steiner case has been altered by Bradley
v. Savidge, Inc." as to what type of evidence is necessary to overcome
the presumption, it has not been overruled as to the type of instruction
to be given when submitted to a jury. The court in the Bradley case
did say, however, that the presumption did not shift the ultimate burden
of proof.
It is clear in Washington, at present at least, that a presumption is
not evidence and does not shift the burden of persuasion. It shifts the
8221 Wash. 287, 57 Pac. 820 (1899).
83 181 Wash. 583, 44 P.2d 808 (1935).
84 41 Wn.2d 780, 252 P2d 581 (1953).
85 48 Wn.2d 211, 292 P.2d 362 (1956).
86 115 Wash. 343, 197 Pac. 24 (1921).
87 172 Wash. 396, 20 P.2d 39 (1933).
88 132 Wash. 624, 232 Pac. 929 (1925).
89.30 Wash. 515, 71 Pac. 48 (1902).
90 13 Wn.2d 28, 123 P.2d 780 (1942).
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burden of evidence; i.e. the burden of "going forward" with the evi-
dence.91
Keeping in mind what the Washington court has recently held con-
cerning presumptions, the older cases to the contrary notwithstanding,
it seems that Instruction No. 22 of CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS-
CivnL 2 should be adequate. That instruction reads as follows:
Evidence may be direct or indirect. Direct evidence is that which, if
true, proves a fact in dispute directly.
Indirect evidence is also known as circumstantial evidence. It is evi-
dence which, if true, proves a fact which gives rise to an inference or
presumption of the existence of a fact in dispute.
The law makes no distinction between direct and indirect evidence as
to the degree of proof required, but accepts each as a reasonable method
of proof and respects each for such convincing force as it may carry.
An inference is a deduction which the reason of the jury draws from
the facts proved.
A presumption is a deduction which the law expressly directs to be
made from particular facts. Unless declared by law to be conclusive, it
may be controverted by other evidence. If it is not controverted, the
jury is bound to find in accordance with the presumption.
The fact that a presumption arises is never to be taken to mean a change
in the burden of proof.
If the burden of proof of the issue to which a presumption relates rests
on the party in whose favor the presumption arises, then it is not neces-
sary for the other party to overcome the presumption by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. In that case, the presumption together with any
other evidence supporting it must have more convincing force than the
contrary evidence in order to justify a finding in accordance therewith.
If the party in whose favor the presumption arises does not have the
burden of proof of the issues to which it relates, then it is necessary for
the other party to overcome the presumption by a preponderance of
contrary evidence.
The above instruction seems to embody all of the principles of law re-
cently adopted by the Washington court, both as to the burden of proof
applied to presumptions and as to its effect. The only change the writer
could suggest would be to start the last paragraph with the word
"Therefore," and eliminate the last sentence of the last paragraph, in
91 See State v. Kellberg, 56 Wn.2d 283, 352 P.2d 189 (1960); City of Seattle v.
Bryan, 53 Wn.2d 321, 333 P.2d 680 (1958) ; Kay v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 28 Wn.2d
300, 183 P.2d 181 (1947) ; Gardner v. Seymour, 27 Wn.2d 802, 180 P.2d 564 (1947) ;
Gillingham v. Phelps, 11 Wn.2d 492, 119 P.2d 914 (1941) (statutory presumption
making a prima facie case does not shift the burden of proof or require the adversary
to prove the negative by a preponderance of the evidence).
92 1 CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL [BAJI] (4th ed. 1959 Supp.).
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keeping with the rationale of Hutton v. Martin3 and Mills v. Pacific
County,9 which hold an instruction erroneous where the presumption
operates against the party who has the burden of proof.
When should an instruction on presumptions be given? Of course,
an instruction need not be given in the absence of a true presumption
and should not be given where it is ruled on as a matter of law. If the
presumption is a true one and no rebuttal evidence (interested or dis-
interested) is produced, the court must rule as a matter of law that the
presumed fact exists, and no problem of instructing the jury arises.
In cases where agency is presumed from ownership of a car, the
rebuttal evidence must be "uncontradicted, unimpeached, clear, and
convincing" for the court to rule on it as a matter of law. If the court
determines that the rebuttal evidence is of that quality, then it must
rule, as a matter of law, against the presumption. If the evidence is not
of sufficient quality, it must go to the jury." This rule should apply to
similar cases, such as those requiring "clear, cogent and convincing"
evidence to overcome the presumptions of competency and honesty, 6
i.e., the court cannot rule as a matter of law unless such evidence is also
"uncontradicted and unimpeached."
If evidence is introduced by the party against whom the presumption
operates, a jury question is usually presented, even though no more
evidence is presented in favor of the presumed fact. This is especially
true in cases where the basic facts giving rise to the presumption have
some probative value presenting a jury question in and of themselves,
or where the evidence presented against the presumption is of doubted
credibility.
What must the trial court do where contradictory evidence is sub-
mitted which establishes a prima facie case against the presumption and
no evidence is submitted in substantiation of the presumption? In a
recent summary judgment case, Bates v. Bowles White & Co., Inc.,"7
the Washington court held that where a presumption is met by a prima
facie case against it, the trial court must rule, as a matter of law, against
the presumption since it has lost its "efficacy." The court said, in effect,
that where a presumption, unsupported by other evidence, is met by a
prima facie case it is not to be submitted to the jury. If the prima facie
03 41 Wn2d 780, 252 P.2d 581 (1953).
94 48 Wn.2d 211, 292 P.2d 362 (1956).95 See Callen v. Coca Cola Bottling, 50 Wn.2d 180, 310 P2d 236 (1957) ; Bradley
v. Savidge, Inc., 13 Wn.2d 28, 123 P.2d 780 (1942).90 Binder v. Binder, 50 Wn.2d 142, 309 P.2d 1050 (1957).
97 56 Wn2d 374, 353 P2d 663 (1960).
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case is disbelieved or could be disbelieved by a trier of fact,9" the pre-
sumption has not lost its efficacy. Thus it seems that the Bates case
stands only for the proposition that if the prima facie case is unim-
peached and uncontradicted and so unimpeachable that reasonable
minds could not differ as to its veracity, then, and then only, there is no
jury question. That certainly is the meaning of the Bradley and Callen
cases.
9 9
It is the writer's opinion that until the Washington Supreme Court
adopts the Thayerian Theory or states otherwise, a true presumption
should be submitted to the jury by means of the instruction suggested...
if the foundation facts have been proven by believable evidence, even
though unsupported by other evidence of the presumed fact, and even
though it is contradicted by a prima facie case, unless:
(1) The foundation facts giving rise to the presumption have no
probative value in and of themselves upon which reasonable minds
could differ; and (2) The evidence supporting the prima facie case is
so unimpeachable or irresistible that reasonable minds cannot differ
as to its weight or veracity. To do otherwise would destroy the whole
concept of presumptions, as well as the function of the jury.
In cases where the presumed fact is substantiated by other believable
evidence, it must be submitted to the jury with proper instructions, even
though met by substantial proof or a prima facie case.
Inconsistent Presumptions. One suggested method for handling
inconsistent presumptions is contained in the UNIFORm RULES OF Evi-
DENCE.
Inconsistent Presumptions. If two presumptions arise which are con-
flicting with each other the judge shall apply the presumption which is
founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic. If there is
no such preponderance both presumptions shall be disregarded.101
The problems confronting a trial court in determining which presump-
tion is the "weightier" is discussed in the "comment" following the rule.
98 Even uncontradicted evidence is not binding on a jury when the jury can find
circumstances inconsistent with it; and a jury is not at all bound to believe interested
testimony. See Pearsall v. Paltas, 48 Wn.2d 78, 291 P.2d 414 (1955) ; Brotherton v.
Day & Night Fuel Co., 192 Wash. 362, 73 P.2d 788 (1937).
99 Callen v. Coca Cola Bottling, 50 Wn.2d 180, 310 P.2d 236 (1957); Bradley v.
Savidge, Inc., 13 Wn.2d 28, 123 P.2d 780 (1942). See also City of Seattle v. Bryan,
53 Wn.2d 321, 333 P.2d 680 (1958), in which the court held that a jury question was
presented where the state's case, based upon the statutory presumption of intoxication,
was rebutted by the testimony of an interested witness.





As a practical matter, where there are two conflicting presumptions, one
of them usually operates against the party having the burden of proof
and the other operates in his favor. If that is the case and if the
rationale of Hutton v. Martin °2 is applied, the presumption operating
against the party having the burden of proof will be disregarded since
it is swallowed up by the stock instruction on burden of proof. Only
the presumption operating in favor of the party having the burden of
proof should be mentioned and the suggested instruction given."0 3 In
criminal cases, however, the admonition of the court set out in State v.
Kellberg'" should be heeded; which in effect, makes a presumption
operating against the defendant merely a permissive inference. 0 5
Quality of Evidence. Some Washington cases indicate that the
usual civil case burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence
changes. This is especially true in fraud cases, and cases where the
plaintiff seeks to prove lack of testamentary capacity, in which courts
require the proof to be "clear, cogent and convincing." The first case
to indicate such a change (not a shift) in the burden of persuasion was
Clark v. Federal Motor Truck Sales Corp. °8 The case involved fraud
and the Washington court held it reversible error to instruct the jury
that the plaintiff must prove all elements of his case by a "fair pre-
ponderance of the evidence," even though three special instructions
advised the jury that the burden rested on the plaintiff to establish his
case by "clear and convincing" evidence. The court said the instruc-
tions were "confusing" and cited two cases'07 as authority for its ruling.
It is interesting to note that the two cases cited deal with confusing
instructions generally, and do not deal with burden of proof. They do
not support the holding that the instructions were in fact "confusing."
-An identical situation was presented in Olympia Credit Bureau, Inc. v.
Smedegard,"'0 in which the court adopted the rule announced in the
Clark case and said:
The statement of the correct rule, i.e., that fraud must be proved by
clear, cogent and convincing evidence, given in a general instruction,
1.0241 Wn.2d 780, 252 P.2d 581 (1953).103 Instruction 22, 1 CALiFoRNIA JuRy INsTRUcTIONs-CrviL [BAJI] (4th ed. 1959
Supp.).104 56 Wn.2d 283, 352 P2d 189 (1960).
105 Compare, however, City of Seattle v. Bryan, 53 Wn.2d 321, 333 P.2d 680 (1958),
in which the Washington court approved an instruction on the presumption alone, even
though rebuttal evidence was introduced.
106 175 Wash. 438, 27 P.2d 726 (1933).
107 Matteson v. Thiel, 162 Wash. 193, 298 Pac. 333 (1931) ; Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.
v. Oregon-Wash. K.R. & Nay. Co., 96 Wash. 113, 164 Pac. 765 (1917).108 40 Wn.2d 76, 78, 241 P.2d 203, 204 (1952).
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cannot cure the error of applying the test of a preponderance of the evi-
dence to the establishment of fraud under the facts of the particular case.
In Cheesman v. Sathre, °9 the court again adhered to the rule, saying:
"Unquestionably, the words 'clear, cogent, and convincing' mean some-
thing more than a mere preponderance of the evidence." (Emphasis
added.) The Washington court recently held clear, cogent and con-
vincing evidence necessary to prove mental incompetency," ° which
inferentially at least, would require "something more than a mere pre-
ponderance of the evidence." The same could be said for all cases in
Washington which require that quality of evidence, such as the cases
holding that the evidence to overcome the presumption of testamentary
capacity must be "clear, cogent and convincing."
11 1
The fallacy of the Clark case, so ardently followed by the Washington
court in the later cases, is apparent on close scrutiny. The traditional
burden of proof is not incongruous with the requirement that the evi-
dence also must be "clear and convincing" or "clear, cogent and con-
vincing," since burden of proof deals in comparisons and not in quality
of proof alone. A sharp distinction is drawn between the "quality" of
evidence and the quantum of evidence in an early Washington case." 2
Ohlson v. Sawbridge"'l clearly defines "preponderance of the evidence"
as the greater weight of evidence on the one side when "contrasted and
weighed" against the evidence opposed to it. The Ohlson case is fol-
lowed to this day in stock instructions. In the usual civil case then, the
burden is not one of fineness but one of comparison of probability or
weight. The weight takes into account not only the quality or fineness,
but also the number of witnesses and amount of proof, regardless of
fineness. As a matter of fact, in the usual civil case an issue may be
found in accord with the preponderance of evidence, and yet the mind
may be left in doubt as to the very truth.' 4 In other words, the scales
of justice may be tipped by evidence that is good, bad or only fair.
Whether evidence is "clear and convincing" is undoubtedly one factor
in the comparison but not the only one, since the evidence on both sides
109 45 Wn.2d 193, 197, 273 P.2d 500, 502 (1954).
110 Binder v. Binder, 50 Wn.2d 142, 309 P.2d 1050 (1957).
111 See In re Peters' Estate, 43 Wn.2d 846, 264 P.2d 1109 (1953).
112 Gilmore v. Seattle & Renton Ry., 29 Wash. 150, 69 Pac. 743 (1902). See also
Peart v. Perry, 152 Wash. 5, 277 Pac. 81 (1929), in which the same distinction is made.
113 156 Wash. 430, 287 Pac. 206 (1930).
114 See Heacock v. Baule, 216 Iowa 311, 249 N.W. 437 (1932). Actually, when
dealing with burden of proof in a civil case, one is dealing with probabilities, i.e., the
party having the burden of proof must persuade the finder of fact that the proposition
on which he has the burden of proof is more probably true than not true. It is sub-
mitted that perhaps a definition along those lines would be more understandable to ajury than the traditional definition of burden of proof now usually given in Washington.
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may be of that degree of fineness and so considered by the jury. The
jury, however, must reach a verdict. They should not be instructed that
they can find for a party simply because he submits evidence that is
"clear and convincing," and nothing more. They would be told to
weigh without a scale. However, if the jury is told that the plaintiff in
such a case must prove its case by "clear, cogent and convincing evi-
dence that preponderates over the evidence of the opposite party," both
the quality and the quantum of evidence necessary is taken into account
and the traditional burden of proof is not disturbed. If, on the other
hand, it is said that the burden of proof must be met by something dif-
ferent than a preponderance of the evidence, then what scale or measure
is used? Is it "beyond a reasonable doubt" or somewhere between that
and a "fair preponderance of the evidence?" If it is somewhere be-
tween, how far down the scale does one go?
The basic theme of this article is to simplify instructions; not to make
them more confusing. Accordingly, it seems wiser to instruct the jury
that the plaintiff must prove his case by evidence which is clear, cogent
and convincing, and which preponderates over the opposing evidence.
Trial attorneys and trial courts should remember the mandate of the
Clark case, 1 ' however. No one can say for sure whether the Washing-
ton court will persist in following it.
Instructions Regarding Evidence Evenly Balanced. Much diffi-
culty has been encountered in Washington in wording instructions tell-
ing a jury what to do in the event the evidence for both parties is
"evenly balanced." In the recent case of Dods v. Harrison,"' the court
rejected an instruction that told the jury if it was "unable to find from
a preponderance of the evidence whose negligence, if any was negligent,
was the direct and proximate cause of the injuries," then the verdict
should be for the defendants. (Emphasis added.)" 7
In another recent case, Chase v. Beard,"8 the court approved an
instruction which said that if the evidence were "evenly balanced," the
jury should find for the defendant. Likewise, the court approved such
an instruction in Sherman v. Mobbs,"' distinguishing the Dods case.
The Washington court has also held that while the giving of such an
instruction is not error, if correctly worded, the refusal to give it is also
'1 Clark v. Federal Motor Truck Sales Corp., 175 Wash. 438, 27 P.2d 726 (1933).
118 51 Wn2d 446, 319 P2d 558 (1957).
"17 Id. at 449, 319 P.2d at 560.
11s 55 Wn.2d 58, 346 P.2d 315 (1959).
110 55 Wn.2d 202, 347 P.2d 189 (1959).
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not error where the jury is otherwise adequately instructed on the bur-
den of proof in the traditional manner."' In the interest of brevity and
simplicity, it is suggested that the trial court reject "evenly balanced"
instructions, since the matter is and should be adequately covered by
the traditional instruction on burden of proof.
COMMENT ON THE EVIDENCE
As a further incentive to simplification, the "no comment" provision
of the Washington Constitution provides that "Judges shall not charge
juries with respect to matters of fact, nor comment thereon, but shall
declare the law."' 2- An instruction which assumes as true the essence
or nonessence of any material fact in issue, in respect of which the
evidence is conflicting, is a comment on the evidence and should never
be given.' The constitutional provision simply means that the court
is prohibited from informing the jury, by either words or actions, of its
own personal opinion upon any evidentiary matter. 12 3 The assumption
or recital of undisputed, admitted or conclusively shown facts in an
instruction does not constitute a comment on the evidence. 4 Instruc-
tions are not open to the objection that they assume controverted facts
where they merely state the issues of the case, claims of the parties,
matters of common knowledge, or abstract legal propositions without
applying them to the facts, if they do not mislead or confuse the jury.'
If controverted facts are mentioned by the court, the instruction
should be worded hypothetically. It should start out with the words "If
you find by a preponderance of the evidence .. .;" or the recitation of
facts should be followed by the words "if any" or "if you so find.'
26
As stated by the author of REID'S BRANSON:
There is an invasion of the province of the jury where the judge:
(1) states an uncontroverted fact hypothetically; or (2) asserts a con-
120 See Johnson v. Barnes, 55 Wn.2d 785, 350 P.2d 471 (1960) ; Dods v. Harrison,
51 Wn.2d 446, 319 P.2d 558 (1957). See also ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
122, § 21.06 (1961), in which the committee "recommends that no 'evenly balanced
evidence' instruction be given."
121 WAsII. CONST. art. IV, § 16.
122 See Cauble v. Dahl, 48 Wn.2d 440, 294 P.2d 416 (1956); Ashley v. Ensley, 44
Wn.2d 74, 265 P.2d 829 (1954).
123 See State v. Reed, 56 Wn.2d 668, 354 P.2d 935 (1960); State v. Meyers, 53
Wn.2d 446, 334 P.2d 536 (1959).
124 See Case v. Peterson, 17 XWn.2d 523, 136 P.2d 192 (1943) ; Blair v. Calhoun, 87
Wash. 154, 151 Pac. 259 (1915).
125 See Herndon v. City of Seattle, 11 Wn.2d 88, 118 P.2d 421 (1941) ; Brammer v.
Lappenbusch, 176 Wash. 625, 30 P.2d 947 (1934) ; Settles v. Johnson, 162 Wash. 466,
298 Pac. 690 (1931).
126 See Lee & Eastes v. Continental Carriers, 44 Wn.2d 28, 265 P.2d 257 (1953)
Caywood v. Seattle Elec. Co., 59 Wash. 566, 110 Pac. 420 (1910).
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troverted fact instead of stating it hypothetically; or (3) fails to hypo-
thetically state all the essential facts necessary to be found as a basis for
the indicated verdict.1 2
7
While hypothetical instructions or so-called formula instructions are
frowned upon by some courts,128 they do not constitute a comment on
the evidence in Washington, and may be necessary in properly sub-
mitting a party's theory of the case to the jury. They should be used
sparingly and should not be complicated or repetitive of general instruc-
tions where the general instructions are adequate. The following obser-
vation was made by the Washington Supreme Court:
In simple negligence cases, such as this one, in order to be fair to both
parties litigant, instructions should not go beyond a simple general
statement of the basic requirement of the law respecting ordinary care,
unless it is necessary to explain one party's duty with respect to a
unique or special phase of the particular case. If the average juror
should be able to apply a simple general statement of the law properly
to all the facts in the case, then a further instruction is unnecessary.12 9
Proposed instructions advising the jury that it may or should con-
sider certain specific evidence in arriving at certain conclusions or
findings or in arriving at a verdict should ordinarily be rejected. They
are often proposed in negligence cases where one party wishes to call
attention to certain facts in evidence as indicative of distance or speed.
While such instructions may be legally correct and, if worded properly,
may not technically be a comment on the evidence, they approach
"comment" since they intimate to the jury that the judge thinks that
particular evidence commands special attention or has more weight
than the other evidence. They tend to "highlight" or "pinpoint" certain
evidence to the detriment of other evidence in the case. In that way
they do constitute "comment." Such instructions are ordinarily needless
since the jury will consider all evidence not stricken by the court, and
it is the attorneys' function to (and they undoubtedly will) call atten-
tion to such evidence in their argument. The only time they should be
given is when some other instruction or some special quirk in the case
may lead the jury to believe that it should ignore such evidence, even
though not specifically told to do so. For example, if a jury is told in
an instruction that evidence cannot be considered for certain purposes
or in arriving at certain conclusions, they should also be told whether
127 1 REiD's BPANsox, § 21 (1960).
128 Ibid. 1 CA. JuRy INsTRuCrIoNs-Cvm [BAJI] 18 (1956).129 O'Brien v. City of Seattle, 52 Wn.2d 543, 548, 327 P.2d 433, 436 (1958). Accord,
Barracliff v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 55 Wn.2d 695, 349 P.2d 1080 (1960).
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that same evidence may be considered for other purposes. In most
instances, the whole matter can be covered by a single instruction.
An instruction advising jurors that they may consider the interest,
bias, or demeanor, of a witness in determining the weight they will give
to his testimony is not obnoxious if it applies equally to all parties
and witnesses and does not pinpoint any particular evidence or wit-
ness. 3 ' Another exception occurs in certain damage cases, in which the
jury should be instructed as to what may or should be considered as an
element of damages. While such damage instructions may tend to pin-
point or highlight certain evidence in a general way, they may be neces-
sary to properly advise the jury what may be considered. Such instruc-
tions, if given, should be general in form, and should not call attention
to specific evidence in a specific case, and should be followed by the
words "if any," or be preceded by the words "if you find," where the
evidence is conflicting. An instruction may refer to the evidence only
so long as the reference does not amount to an explanation or criticism
of it, assert or assume that a particular fact is proven,' 3' or unduly
highlight that particular evidence.
MISCELLANEOUS RULES AND SUGGESTIONS
Several other miscellaneous suggestions and rules leading to simpli-
city should be remembered in preparing jury instructions: (1) Instruc-
tions should not be repetitious. Repetitious instructions may or may not
be in error, depending on whether they overemphasize one party's
theory.' (2) The trial court is not required to rewrite a requested
instruction to eliminate inapplicable portions; and unless a requested
instruction may be given without modification, error may not be as-
signed for not giving it. 133 (3) It is not necessary that each instruction
contain a complete exposition of the law applying to the point in con-
troversy." 4 (4) Giving or refusing to give instructions admonishing the
jury not to be influenced by sympathy or prejudice is discretionary with
the trial court." 5 (5) Submitting special interrogatories to the jury is
discretionary with the trial court, whose refusal to submit them will
not be reviewed on appeal. 6
130 See Klepsch v. Donald, 4 Wash. 436, 30 Pac. 991 (1892).
'1 See State v. Collins, 50 Wn.2d 740, 314 P.2d 660 (1957).
132 See Jackson v. Department of Labor & Indus., 54 Wn.2d 643, 343 P.2d 1033
(1959).
133 See Krogh v. Pemble, 50 Wn.2d 250, 310 P.2d 1069 (1957).
134 See Hutton v. Martin, 41 Wn.2d 780, 252 P.2d 581 (1953).
13 See Curtis v. Perry, 171 Wash. 542, 18 P.2d 840 (1933).
136 See Brown v. Intercoastal Fisheries, 34 Wn.2d 48, 207 P.2d 1205 (1949).
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(6) An instruction should not be given simply because it is a direct
quote or excerpt from a supreme court decision. It may be out of con-
text, or may not apply to the conditions of the case being considered.
137
Giving such instructions is a common fault and should be guarded
against by thoroughly understanding the case from which the excerpt
is taken. Thoughts or principles may be borrowed, but not words. Also,
the case from which the quotation or statement is taken should be
analyzed to see whether the court really meant what it seemed to say.
In Kerlik v. Jerke,1" the court said: "Because appellant driver's view
was obstructed, it was incumbent upon him to proceed with extra-
ordinary care." (Emphasis added.) " ' This would seem to change the
Washington ordinary care "doctrine." The next paragraph indicates
that the court is only applying ordinary care, which requires a greater
amount of care, and so, under the circumstances, is in keeping with
Ulve v. Raymond,"' which definitely says that there are no degrees of
care.
Speaking of degrees of care, instructions such as those approved in
Bell v. Bennett,' elaborating on the ordinary care instruction to the
effect that the duty of ordinary care in certain instances is "intensified
rather than diminished," should be forgotten. That type of instruction
here is useless, meaningless and confusing, and should be "diminished"
rather than "intensified." One should strive for simplicity and clarity
rather than duplicity and complication.
(7) Negative instructions need not be given as to matters already
covered by positive instructions.' The practice of giving negative
instructions as to matters already covered by other instructions should
be discouraged. Repetitious instructions, although couched in different
language, do not add to the simplicity or clarity of a jury charge.
SUMMATION
From the observations made heretofore, one may arrive at certain
rules or recommendations:
(1) The final issues of the case should be submitted to the jury in a
simple, clear, concise and complete statement. Instructions should not
be encumbered by long, drawn-out narratives of evidence or argumenta-
tion which may be contained in the pleadings.
'"7 See Hammer v. Haggard, 56 Wn2d 744, 355 P.2d 334 (1960).
188 56 Wn2d 575, 354 P.2d 702 (1960).
130 Id. at 577, 354 P2d at 705.
14051 Wn.2d 241, 317 P.2d 908 (1957).
14156 Wn.2d 780, 355 P2d 331 (1960).
142 See State v. Harvey, 157 Wash. Dec. 189, 356 P.2d 726 (1960).
19611
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
(2) Material facts in controversy, in respect of which the evidence
is conflicting, must not be assumed but should be treated hypothetically.
However, long, complicated hypothetical instructions should be avoided.
(3) Each party is entitled to have his theory of the case presented in
instructions to the jury if there is substantial evidence in the case to
support it. Instructions on the theory of the case should not be repeti-
tive, argumentative, complicated or confusing.
(4) Instructions on presumptions and burden of proof should be
carefully worded, keeping the rationale of the holdings of the supreme
court in mind. They should ordinarily be omitted where the matter has
been adequately covered by traditional instructions on burden of proof,
or where true presumptions are not involved.
(5) Instructions should not be repetitious or given where the matter
is substantially covered by other instructions, where they will single out
a particular item of evidence for comment, or give undue prominence
to certain phases of the case. The mere fact that the supreme court
has held it not to be erroneous to give some particular instruction does
not mean that it must be given, nor does it mean that two or more
slanted instructions should be given where one good general instruction
will adequately cover the subject. Slanted instructions should be en-
tirely eliminated. 4 '
(6) Instructions should be refused where they are ambiguous, mis-
leading or not entirely correct.
(7) Special interrogatories are discretionary with the trial court.
They should be given where they will perhaps prevent the need for a
new trial or are necessary to a complete determination of the case.
They should not be given out of curiosity or as a trap for a new trial.
(8) Instructions should never be given unless they are called into
play by the issues or evidence of the case, and then only if they are
pertinent to the issues and evidence.
1-1 See Duplanty v. Matson Nay. Co., 53 Wn.2d 434, 333 P.2d 1092 (1959), in which
the Washington court held it not error to refuse to give three proposed instructions,
which were "argumentative and slanted," the instructions given being complete and
proper. The proposed instructions are three frequent offenders: (1) stating that a
person may not cast the burden of his protection upon another but must use his own
intelligence and faculties for his own protection, etc.; (2) stating that the defendant
is not an insurer and is liable only for his negligence; and (3) stating that one is
charged with the duty of seeing those objects or persons, which he would have seen
had he been exercising reasonable care. These three instructions have been proposed
many times, and given many times, and are, perhaps, not in error if given. Neverthe-
less, they are not required and should not be given where the usual unslanted instruc-
tions on negligence and burden of proof cover the issues of the case adequately.
Accord, Gaunt v. Alaska Steamship Co., 157 Wash. Dec. 747, 360 P.2d 354 (1961).
[VOL. 36
INSTRUCTING A JURY
(9) Finally, and most important, instructions should be correct,
plain, simple, concise and limited to as few in number as possible. If it
is deemed necessary to give an instruction, it should be tested by the
following questions: (a) Is it a completely correct statement of the law?
(b) Is it as brief as possible? (c) Is it understandable to the average
juror? (d) Is it impartial, unslanted and free from argument?
CONCLUSION
It is hoped that this article, though certainly not an unique approach
to an old problem, will inspire some positive thinking on the dire need
in Washington for standardized or pattern jury instructions, similar to
those developed in other states. 44 Uniform instructions will lead to
better and simplified instructions, and greatly minimize error."' They
144 The following states, among others, have apparently developed so-called uniform
or pattern jury instructions: Alabama (an article in 58 DicK. L. REv. 354, 360 (1954),
says, without citing authority, that Alabama has uniform jury instructions) ; California
(prepared by judges of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, financed by royalties
and entitled CALIFORNIA JURY INsTRUCnoNs-CvmL, also known as BAJI, and CALI-
FORmqIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL, also known as CALJIC, published by West
Publishing Co. in 1956 and 1958) ; Illinois (prepared by a committee, comprised of
lawyers, judges and law professors, appointed by the Supreme Court of Illinois, effec-
tive Feb. 1, 1961, and entitled ILLINoIs PATrmNw JURY INSTRUCTIONs-CVL, also
known as IPI, published in 1961 and being sold for $20.00 per copy by Burdette Smith
Co. of Chicago) ; Iowa (prepared by the State Bar Association under grant from the
Iowa State Bar Foundation and distributed to each member of the association without
charge; referred to in 44 J. AM. JuD. Soc'Y 148 (1960)) ; Nebraska (the first instruc-
tions were published in pamphlet form and supplemented in 33 NEB. L. REv. 124
(1953)) ; Utah (referred to in 5 UTAH L. REv. 149 (1956)) ; Wisconsin (approved by
Wisconsin Board of Circuit Judges in 1960, entitled WISCONSIN JuRY INSTRUCTIONS-
Criv, Part 1, published and sold by the University of Wisconsin Extension Law Dept.
in loose-leaf form for $20.00 per copy). It is interesting to note that the Supreme
Court of Illinois, by Supreme Court Rule 25-1 requires the use of the applicable IPI
instruction if the trial court, after due consideration of the law and the facts, deter-
mines that the jury should be instructed on the subject, unless the court determines
that it does not accurately state the law, and if an IPI instruction is not used that the
instruction on the subject "be simple, brief, impartial and free from argument." It is
the writer's opinion that the ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS [IPI] is the finest
work of its kind yet published and the procedure used in developing the work product,
as outlined in the foreword to the publication, might well be imitated. The Illinois
Supreme Court has effectively and commendably eliminated the so-called "slanted" in-
struction. Minnesota is working on such a project according to 44 J. AM. Jun. Soc'Y
107 (1960).
145 See Reed v. Stroh, 54 Cal. App.2d 183, 188, 128 P.2d 829, 832 (1942), in which
the court said: 'We again suggest the advisability of conforming instructions with the
California Jury Instruction, Civil, sometimes referred to as BAJI, prepared by the
Superior Court of Los Angeles County. A more generous use of such forms and a
more consistent adoption of the system of stating the law free from unnecessary verbi-
age, as indicated by such forms, is calculated to diminish the causes for appeals and at
the same time will serve as insurance against the confusion of juries." See also com-
ment of Gerald C. Snyder, Chairman of Illinois Supreme Court Committee On Jury
Instructions contained in Foreword, ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS [IPI] at
xix (1961), in which he said: '"We feel that under this instruction system the 38%
record of reversals, based in whole or in part upon erroneous instructions, will be
practically eliminated. The saving of the time of Courts, counsel and witnesses, and
the reduction of the expense to the taxpayer and litigants will amount to millions of
dollars annually. More important, prompt and true administration of justice in jury
trials will be greatly advanced."
1961]
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will also result in a considerable saving of time by both lawyers and
judges at the trial level. It may also be anticipated that the study and
work by the bench and bar in formulating them will lead to the deter-
mination of some of the complex problems now facing us, especially
in regard to the confused state of the law pertaining to such matters
as burden of proof, presumptions and due care. This article has barely
scratched the surface on a few of the problems, but it is hoped that it
will encourage a new appreciation of the difficulties now encountered.
A project to standardize jury instructions on a state-wide basis will not
be easy. It will entail much work, thought, trial and error.14 It will
also call forth many amendments as the years roll by, since jurisprud-
ence is a living, changing science, expressing the thoughts and mores
of the changing times.
143 It took the Illinois Committee four years to prepare the ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS.
